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Abstract: Our study examines how chronic sleep restriction and suboptimal times-of-day affect
decisions in a classic set of social tasks. We experimentally manipulate and objectively
measured sleep in 184 young-adult subjects, who were also randomly assigned an early
morning or late evening experiment session during which decision tasks were administered.
Sleep restriction and suboptimal time-of-day are both estimated to either directly or indirectly
(via an impact on sleepiness) reduce altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. We conclude that
commonly experienced adverse sleep states, most notably chronic sleep restriction,
significantly reduce prosocial behaviors, and can therefore limit benefits from short-term social
interactions.
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1. Introduction
Prosocial behaviors help encourage positive interactions and promote economic institutions
that require trust/trustworthiness. There are numerous factors that may influence the
propensity to exhibit prosocial behaviors. The variable considered in this paper is one that
receives little attention in this area of decision-making research: sleepiness. We examine the
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impact of commonly experienced sleep and circadian states on outcomes in three well-known
simple social interaction tasks: the ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. Prosocial behaviors in
these games, such as trust, are at least a simple indication of social capital of the decision

maker (Putnam, 1993). Some researchers have even found that increases in survey-based
measures of country-level trust promote desirable macroeconomic outcomes, such as
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increased economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) or reduced government corruption
(LaPorta et al., 1997). As such, factors that influence the micro-level choice to behave
prosocially—a type of individual investment in social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002)—have

multiplier effects in society and the economy, and so the importance of this decision domain

M

should not be underestimated.

The limited research that exists on sleep loss and simple social decisions has utilized

ED

highly controlled total sleep loss protocols (Anderson and Dickinson, 2010; Ferrara et al., 2015).
Such protocols help establish the dose-response of behavior to extreme levels of sleep loss, but
the external validity of such findings remains unclear. Observation or field data on sleep levels

PT

and choice are highly externally valid, but the limited or lack of experimental control in such
data (or the potential bias in self-reports of one’s sleep level) reduce one’s ability to identify

CE

causal effects. In short, we believe that generating primary experimental data using an
ecologically valid sleep setting is a valuable approach for studying this particular research

AC

question. Here, we utilized an at-home sleep manipulation protocol with objective sleep data
acquisition, random treatment assignments, and within-subjects behavioral measures, which
increase our ability to claim causal effects. Sleepiness is one of the more concerning health
trends at present, and so sleepy decision-making is hardly a rare occurrence. Nevertheless, the
weight of the research on sleep and decision making has focused on individual decision tasks

2
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(e.g., Harrison and Horne, 2000; Killgore et al., 2006), which leaves a gap in our understanding
of how adverse sleep states affect choices in a critical decision domain.
A main contribution of our work is to experimentally manipulate sleep in ecologically
valid ways that are highly applicable to the real world—the levels of sleep restriction we
examine are pervasive in modern society and part of everyday life for nearly 30% of U.S. adults
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(Schoenborn and Adams, 2010). And, while the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
has labeled sleep deprivation a public health epidemic, little is known about how commonly
experienced adverse sleep states impact social interactions. We hypothesize that increased
sleepiness will reduce prosocial behaviors given the (limited) related research and given our
understanding of deliberative thinking and social decisions (Anderson and Dickinson, 2010;
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Ferrara et al., 2015; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2001; Chee
and Chuah, 2008). This hypothesis suggests that sleepiness leads to inefficiencies or unrealized
benefits in social exchanges.

Results from our 3-week at-home sleep protocol study indicate that both sleep

M

restriction and suboptimal time of day either directly or indirectly (through sleepiness) reduce
simple behavioral measures of prosocial decisions. Estimated reductions in dictator giving are

ED

the most robust, though our multivariate estimation results show significant decreases for trust
and trustworthiness in most specifications as well. Given that these simple games can be
considered building blocks for more complex social interactions, such findings have important

PT

implications. A significant portion of adults in many countries have habitual sleep levels similar
to those we study, and sleep restricted decision-making at suboptimal times of day is common

CE

in modern society as well. Our data draw attention to a typically overlooked behavioral “cost”
of these modern sleep trends. At least in the area of social interactions, sleepiness may

AC

contribute to a type of dead-weight loss of potential benefits that has not been previously
highlighted.

1.1 Background
Our behavioral hypothesis stems from the argument that prosocial behavior requires
deliberative thinking and active suppression of myopic self-interest (Rilling and Sanfey., 2011;
3
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McCabe et al., 2001; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Achtziger et al., 2016). Interestingly, recent
evidence suggests that reduced deliberation may promote altruism and cooperation in certain
contexts (Rand, et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2016), although other studies found
no such relationship (Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014; Tinghög et al., 2013; Krajbich et al.,
2015). It is important to note, however, that these studies typically employ standard cognitive

CR
IP
T

load or time pressure manipulations that are not directly comparable to our manipulation.1
Another distinct manipulation in the literature that is intended to reduce deliberation is
referred to as “ego depletion”, which seems to impact motivational aspects of task

performance more than cognition (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012).2 Notably, Ainsworth et al.
(2012) reported reduced trust following ego depletion, and a study by Vohs et al. (2010)
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crossed ego-depletion with sleep deprivation and found that only ego-depletion influenced the
expression of the negative social behavior of aggression. Thus, the existing research leads to
the natural question of whether we believe our sleep manipulations will affect pro-social
behavior by harming cognition or task motivation.

M

It has been argued that sleep loss may impact motivation as well as cognition, but the
mixed evidence includes examples where no significant motivation decline is reported (e.g.,

ED

Drummond et al, 2005), while others report significant motivational decline following sleep
deprivation (e.g., Almklov et al, 2014). However, even when short, novel, or incentivized tasks
are used to mitigate motivational decline caused by sleep loss (see Alhola and Polo-Kantola,

PT

2007, and sources therein), performance decrements are still observed. This argues that
cognitive effects likely dominate any motivation effects of our treatment manipulation—our

CE

tasks are incentivized, short, and relatively novel for the subjects. Another recent study
concludes that self-regulation (the target of ego depletion manipulations) and fatigue are not

AC

overlapping constructs (Vohs et al, 2010), which supports our view of dominant cognition
effects over motivational effects in our design. Thus, compared to commonly used alternative
protocols aimed at reducing deliberative processes, ours is unique and focused on cognitive

1

Distinct from the other studies mentioned, Krahbich et al, 2015, examined patients with prefrontal lesions.
With an ego depletion manipulation, a subject is made to exert self-control of some sort at time t, and then
administration of another task requiring self-control is administered at time t+1. Ego depletion is meant to reduce
one’s capacity to self-regulate in the time t+1 task.
2
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effects of mild adverse sleep states. We also argue that our ecologically valid at-home sleep
protocol implies that our results have more clear implications for real world decision makers.
For our research question, another relevant stream of literature has identified the
importance of deliberative thinking for prosocial decisions (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Krajbich et
al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2001; Fehr and Camerer, 2007). This is important because the
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prefrontal cortex (PFC) is particularly vulnerable to sleep deprivation. Some studies report
negative sleep impacts on PFC function (Horne, 1993; Muzur et al, 2002; Chee and Chua, 2008),
and Horne (1993) reports a more general link between sleep deprivation and reduced PFC
activation. This is consistent with recent neural and behavioral studies showing the negative
impact of adverse sleep or circadian states on deliberative decisions (Yoo et al., 2007; McElroy
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and Dickinson, 2010; Dickinson and McElroy, 2010). However, in other contexts researchers
have reported increased PFC activation following sleep deprivation. For example,
compensatory PFC activation on a verbal learning task is reported in Drummond et al. (2000)
following total sleep loss. Regarding decision making studies, Venkatraman et al. (2011)

M

documented increased ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) activation following sleep deprivation in a
risk-taking task. The authors attributed the increase in vmPFC activation following sleep loss to

ED

an increased focus on monetary gains. However, rather than improving decision making,
increased vmPFC activation appears to suggest an optimism bias triggered by sleep loss (see
also Venkatraman et al., 2007; 2009). Our interpretation of this literature is that sleep

PT

deprivation, while increasing some PFC activation on certain tasks, has not been found to
improve deliberative processes useful for optimal decision making. In fact, others have noted

2012).

CE

the negative impact of sleep loss on decisions that rely particularly on the vmPFC (Killgore et al.,

AC

Somewhat related to the issue of PFC importance in social decisions, researchers have

reported higher altruism and trust levels in older adolescents (Benenson et al., 2007; Fehr et al.,
2008; Fehr et al., 2013). Such findings also support the hypothesis that the PFC, which
develops later than other brain regions, is important for prosocial choice. As a whole, we find
that the weight of the existing evidence suggests PFC vulnerability to adverse sleep or circadian
states, and PFC function is important for prosocial choice. While this is a somewhat overly
5
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simplified characterization of the literature, it is useful in organizing our thinking and forming
our hypothesis regarding the likely impact of our experiment manipulation in the domain of
social choice. Our hypothesis can be succinctly stated as follows:

day—will make less prosocial decisions.

1.2 Experimental Protocol
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Hypothesis: Sleepy subjects—whether from sleep restriction or suboptimal time of

Our starting point was to first generate a database of young-adults (18-39 year olds) for
whom we had specific sleep-related information—some of this was to address inclusion criteria
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for the main experimental study and some was in order to manage random session-time

assignments. We first administered a large-scale online survey that included questions on basic
demographics, recent sleep habits, validated anxiety and depressive disorder screener
questions, and a validated morningness-eveningness questionnaire. Over multiple waves of the

M

online survey we generated several thousand responses to our survey (mostly student
responses).3 Criteria for viable subjects for the main study included: those below standard

ED

cutoffs for risk of major depressive or anxiety disorder, no diagnosed sleep disorder or selfreported insomnia, between 18-39 years of age. To assess diurnal preference, the survey
administered a validated short form of the morningness-eveningness questionnaire, henceforth

PT

rMEQ (Adan and Almiral, 1991). The rMEQ classifies individuals on a continuous scale of 4-25,
with morning-types having a rMEQ score from 18-25 and evening-types having a rMEQ score

CE

from 4-11. Though based on subject self-reports, the methodology has been validated against
physiological data on oral temperatures (Horne and Östberg, 1976) and is a standard tool in

AC

circadian research. A validated measure of diurnal preference was necessary for the validity of
our random session time assignments.

3

While some have argued that laboratory experiments may overstate social behaviors (Levitt and List, 2007),
recent research suggests that the use of student subject pools may, if anything, underestimate the importance of
social behaviors in the general population (Falk et al, 2013). What is important is to note that the qualitative
direction of our results suggest damaging effects of relatively mild adverse sleep states on prosocial behaviors.

6
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We identified morning-types (MT) and evening-types (ET) in the database and randomly
assigned each potential subject, ex ante, to a morning (7:30 a.m.) or an evening (10:00 p.m.)
experiment session prior to sending out recruitment emails. Due to the rarity of true MT
subjects—less than 10% in young adult populations are morning-types (see Chelminski et al,
2000)—we extended our rMEQ cutoff for MT to include rMEQ scores of 16 and 17. To
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compensate, we only recruited the more extreme (and still abundant) ET subjects with rMEQ
scores from 4-9.4 This approach helped ensure that the sample we recruited for the main study
was comprised of individuals with true morningness or eveningness preferences. 5

For the main study, subjects were recruited for a 3-week experiment protocol with
multiple in-lab sessions each occurring at the same randomly assigned time-of-day for that
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subject. The 3-week protocol allowed for a within-subjects manipulation of at-home sleep
levels, as discussed in the next paragraph. Another design option would have been to vary the
time of day for the lab sessions such that each subject was administered decision tasks both at
a more optimal (circadian matched) and less optimal (circadian mismatched, MM) time of day.

M

That is, a within-subjects circadian mismatch protocol was an alternative design choice.
However, one of our concerns was subject scheduling and the difficulties in recruiting and

ED

preserving participation of subjects with non-constant session times-of-day, and so we chose to
proceed with the circadian portion of the protocol as a between-subjects design feature (see
Dickinson et al, 2016, for a more complete discussion of subject attrition in this design). Other

PT

researchers may wish to examine optimal versus sub-optimal times-of-day in decision making
as a within-subject design factor, but our design choice was to favor additional statistical power

CE

along the at-home sleep restriction dimension.
Subjects were recruited in groups (average size was about 13 subjects) and, while each

AC

experimental group was either designated a “morning session” or “evening session” group,

4

In this way, our sample was still drawn from the tails of the rMEQ distribution and eliminated the same amount
of support from the non-tail portion of the rMEQ distribution compared to if we had used the traditional MT cutoff
(rMEQ=18) but included non-extreme ET (rMEQ=10-11) in our sample.
5
Others studies have assessed diurnal preferences only after recruitment, and then used a median split to classify
subjects as morning-types or evening-types (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008). Given the
distribution of diurnal preferences among young adult subjects (see Chelminski et al, 2000), the approach will
incorrectly classify many intermediate or indeterminate type subjects as morning-types.

7
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there was a mix of morning-type and evening-type subjects in each group. Figure 1 shows the
timeline of the protocol and when the decision experiment sessions took place. As can be seen,
each subject was prescribed a well-rested (WR: 8-9 hrs/night in bed) and a sleep-restricted (SR:
5-6 hrs/night in bed) week with an ad-lib sleep week in between. A small number (n=30) of
control subjects were recruited as well to assess pure repeat administration effects. Control
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subjects were intermediate diurnal preference individuals, attended experiment sessions at
mid-day (neither early nor late), and they were assigned WR sleep weeks in both Week 1 and
Week 3 of the protocol.

The set of bargaining tasks was administered at the end of weeks 1 and 3 (i.e., at the
end of each sleep treatment week). Because the session time-of-day remains constant for a

AN
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given subject, this is a mixed design with between-subjects (circadian match/mismatch) and
within-subjects (SR/WR) components. Subject sleep levels are objectively monitored during the
entire three weeks with actigraphy devices that allow for raw data output (see Appendix for
model of devices, which are commonly used in sleep and clinical research and are well-

M

validated). Scoring the sleep data involved complementary sleep diary input as well as the
objective actigraphy data, and subjects were paid a separate fixed payment ($80) for providing

ED

the 3 weeks of sleep data. Subjects were deemed compliant if average nightly sleep during the
WR week was at least 60 minutes more than during the SR week. The Appendix discusses the
legitimacy and data-driven approach to this standard for compliance in detail (see also

PT

Dickinson et al, 2016, for more extensive details and analysis of the sleep protocol).

CE

1.3 Decision Tasks

We administered the ultimatum (Güth et al., 1982), Dictator game (Forsythe, et al.,

AC

1994), and Trust games (Berg et al., 1995) twice for each subject—once following SR and once
following WR. For the Ultimatum and Dictator games we used a $10 starting sum. In the
Ultimatum game, the first-mover proposes a division of the $10 and the second-mover may
either accept or reject the offer. Both players receive a zero payoff if the offer is rejected. The
Dictator game removes the second-mover decision from the game, such that the dictator
simply decides how the $10 will be divided between the two players. For the $10 Trust game
8
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we did not endow the responder with any money, (and so, a subject attempting to equalize
first-mover/second-mover earnings will send back a different amount than if both first and
second-mover were endowed with $10). The first mover may choose to pass (trust) some, all,
or none of the $10 to the second-mover. Whatever is trusted to the second mover is then
tripled by the experimenter, and the second-mover can then choose to pass back some, all, or
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none of the tripled amount. The amount passed back is generally viewed as a measure of

trustworthiness. We also administered a “risk” version of the Trust game where the secondmover is a pass-back algorithm rather than another subject in the group. In this way, we can
identify the importance of the social interaction, as opposed to the pure risk of passing money,
in making the interpersonal decision (see Sanfey et al., 2003; Kosfeld et al., 2005).
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The games were administered via the strategy method whereby all subjects made

decisions as first-mover and second-mover prior to knowing to which role he/she was randomly
assigned. This procedure requires subjects to make decisions as a second-mover in the
Ultimatum and Trust games for all possible contingencies of what the first mover might do. It

M

was common knowledge that we would make random role assignments (first- or secondmover), anonymous counterpart assignments, and randomly select one of games for payoff for

ED

that decision session only after all decisions were made for all tasks. Outcomes for the
randomly selected payoff game were only revealed at the end of the decision session, when
payoffs for these and other decision tasks were given out in cash.6 During the second decision

PT

session (Session 3 in Figure 1) subjects were informed that the roles, counterparts, and the
payoff game were re-randomized (i.e., not the same as in the first decision session).

CE

In total, we recruited 184 young adults (30 control: 154 treatment: 18-39 years old,
mean 21.66 ± 4.43 years old) to participate in the 3-week study. The relevance of our results to

AC

real world decision makers are, in large part, due to an at-home sleep and circadian protocol

6

Note that the fixed payment for participation was separate from the cash incentive payments for outcomes in the
decision experiments. Subjects could receive the $80 fixed payment by check or Amazon gift code, which was sent
out several days after the end of the experiment so that sleep data could be first checked for instances of apparent
gross noncompliance. The compliance standard for issuing experiment payment was more liberal than the
standard we used for considering the sleep data compliant with the treatment condition. In general, to maintain
satisfaction in the subject pool, our position was to fully pay subjects for what appeared a good faith effort at
compliance, even if data were ultimately considered noncompliant for analysis purposes. This more liberal
payment policy was not known to subjects during their participation.

9

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

with high ecological validity. Table 1 shows the mix or circadian matched versus mismatched
subjects for the between-subjects component of the design. Of these 184 subjects, 149 (30
control: 119 treatment) were deemed compliant based on objective actigraphy data.7
Compliant treatment subjects slept a minimum of 1 hour more per night during the SR week
than the WR week, but there was variation in the level of compliance (e.g., the average

on the subset of compliant treatment subjects (n=119).

2. Results
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difference between WR and SR nightly sleep was about 1.5 hours). The results below are based

Subjects self-reported sleepiness during the decision sessions using the Karolinska
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Sleepiness scale (Åkerstedt and Billberg, 1990; Kaida et al., 2006). To test treatment

manipulations we regress self-report sleepiness on treatment, demographics, and sleep control
variables. Both SR and circadian mismatch significantly increased sleepiness (p<.01), as noted
below,8 which is evidence of the validity of the protocol at manipulating sleepiness. In Table 2

M

we present descriptive statistics of the behavioral outcomes from each task, along with
nonparametric tests of means. Nonparametric tests of the SR treatment effect uses the signed-

ED

rank test for matched data given each subject makes decisions under both SR=0 and SR=1
conditions. For testing means of behavioral outcomes resulting from circadian mismatch (MM),
we used the Mann-Whitney test for unmatched data after first averaging each subject’s

PT

decisions for a task across the two decision sessions. Given our experimental design choice, the
test for MM effects is inherently less statistically powerful than our tests of SR effects on

CE

behavioral outcomes. Results in Table 2 indicate marginally significant SR effects on Dictator
offers and trust decisions. Of course, such tests do not take into account other covariates, and

AC

so a more controlled statistical analysis follows.

7

A small number of treatment-subject observations were lost due to malfunction or corruption of actigraphy
devices (9 subjects). The final sample of 119 compliant subjects and 30 control subjects all had complete
actigraphy data records.
8
The full results of this estimation are shown in Table 6, which is the first stage regression of the two-stage
endogenous variables regression used to evaluate sleepiness as a mediating variable in evaluating behavioral
outcomes.
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We next present results from the multivariate analysis. The general model structure we
estimate is: Yt = a + X + Zwhere Yt is the behavioral outcome, Y, for task, t. X represents a
vector of sleep-related variables, which includes the experimentally manipulated measures of
sleep restriction and circadian mismatch and a measure of chronic daytime sleepiness, Epworth
sleepiness, which is derived from the pre-screen sleep survey. Note that Epworth sleepiness is a
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separate construct from state-level Karolinska self-reported sleepiness elicited during the
decision sessions (simple correlation = .12 between these two measures). Z includes

indicators for the session number (Session 3 dummy indicates the second administration of the
task) and timing (Morning Session = 1), as well as demographic controls such as age, gender,
and sub-clinical depression and anxiety risk scores.9 We estimated the models using a random
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effects error structure for multiple observations per subjects.

Estimation results in Tables 3-6 identify predictors of the key outcome variables for each
social decision task. The relevant treatment variables for sleep restriction and circadian
mismatch are highlighted. The treatment variable, Mismatch, is an indicator variable equal to 1

M

if the subject is mismatched relative to her more preferred time of day. Because there exists
variation in the level of compliance among subjects deemed compliant, a continuous measure

ED

of sleep level is of interest. For each decision outcome, two models are estimated to allow for
different approaches to scoring sleep levels: The first model uses average nightly actigraphymeasured sleep during the week prior to the decision, Nightly Sleep, as the continuous variable

PT

measure for sleep levels. The second model uses a constructed hybrid measure, Personal Sleep
Deprivation, which is the difference between a subject’s self-reported optimal nightly sleep

CE

(from the earlier online sleep survey) and the actigraphy-measured nightly sleep the week prior
to the decision. In a sense, the variable Personal SD, handicaps each individual for his/her

AC

perceived personal sleep need. Additional estimations are included in the Appendix where
sleep restriction is coded as a dichotomous indicator variable (SR=0,1) to identify the SR
treatment week. Regarding the non-treatment control variables, the Session 3 indicator is
robustly significant across estimations of the different behavioral outcome measures. The sign

9

Recall that subjects at clinical risk levels for depressive or anxiety disorder were not recruited for the study.

11
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of the coefficient on Session 3 captures a general tendency to behave in a more self-interested
fashion during the last session.10
The estimated coefficients on the circadian mismatch and sleep level variables allow for
a test of our behavioral hypothesis for each model. The estimated direct effect of circadian
mismatch on behavioral outcomes is insignificant across all models (Tables 3-6), and so we turn
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our attention to the statistically significant (p ≤ .05) estimated direct effect of sleep restriction
on behavioral outcomes—these are an indication that sleep restriction may have a greater
impact on behavior than circadian mismatch, but we should also remind the reader that the
circadian mismatch dimension of the protocol has less statistical power than the sleep

restriction dimension. Regarding sleep restriction, we find significant and robust effects on
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decisions in the Dictator and Trust games. Results from the Ultimatum game are less

convincing, which should not be surprising. The Ultimatum game is standard in this suite of
tasks, but it confounds self-interest with risk of a zero payoff in both first- and second-mover
roles (or, the desire to accumulate money is in conflict with the desire for fairness, as noted in

M

Sanfey et al., 2003). We find weak evidence that ultimatum offers may be less generous for
higher levels of Personal SD (i.e., the more sleep deprived. See Table 3, Model 3), but this effect

ED

is not robust across alternative coding of the sleep restriction variable (see Table 2 and
Appendix).

Turning to the Dictator game, Table 4 identifies a robust result of reduced Dictator

PT

offers when one is sleep restricted (see also Appendix), which is consistent with our hypothesis.
The predicted relationship between Dictator offers and Personal SD is shown graphically in

CE

Figure 2—demographics, session identifier, and sleep related control variables are held
constant. Given the lack of a rejection threat in the Dictator game, offers in this game are more

AC

easily interpreted as a measure of altruism or prosocial behavior than are decisions in the

10

The same is generally true of results from the Control subjects, although there are only 30 such subjects. The
only generally significant variable is the Session 3, variable which, when statistically significant, indicates and
increased greed in choice. Unlike the data from the Treatment subjects, however, Control subjects are not
significantly less trustworthy during the last session than the first decision session. Because of the small sample of
Control Subjects, and the fact that each Treatment subject serves as his/her own baseline regarding the sleep
restriction effect, we do not report Control Subject estimations here. They are available on request.

12
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Ultimatum game results.11 The size of the estimated effect is also non-trivial. Compared to a
fairly typical $3 offer in a Dictator game when not sleep-restricted (Personal SD=0), that same
individual being 2 hours sleep-restricted per night (120 minutes) chronically sleep restricted
would offer $2.40. This represents a 20% reduction in Dictator giving level. 12
Tables 5 and 6 show additional evidence of decreased prosocial behavior in the Trust
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game when sleep restricted. Table 5 also includes results from a “risk” version of the Trust
game where it is common knowledge for subjects that the second-mover is an automated passback algorithm.13 As can be seen in Table 5, the significant reduction in trust due to sleep

restriction occurs only when trust is imbedded in a social interaction (albeit a one-shot and
anonymous interaction in this task). The reduction in trust is also significant because it
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documents how commonplace levels of sleep restriction introduce an inefficiency into the
domain of social interactions. The predicted Trust game result is depicted in Figure 3, and the
magnitude of reduced initial trust amount indicates a lost potential in the 2-person exchange
that is economically significant. The size of the predicted reduction in trust is similar to the

M

reduction in the Dictator game ($.50-$.60), but this represents a slightly smaller effect in
percentage terms relative to typical trust levels, which are around $5-$6 out of a $10 pie (see

ED

Berg et al, 1995).

Trustworthiness results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 4. Here, given the strategymethod nature of choice elicitation, the dependent variable is the average percentage passed

PT

back by the second-mover over all possible initially trusted amounts. We also include an
11

AC

CE

Of course, the Dictator game is not itself without confounds in interpretation as Dictator giving may reflect
concerns that the experimenter knows of one’s decision, or may reflect aversion to payoff inequality (see Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Nevertheless, such factors are present in both the SR and WR decisions of subject, and any
amount of giving intended to reduce inequality aversion can be considered a different form of prosocial behavior.
12
The magnitude of the estimated effect is only slightly smaller—about a 16%-17% reduction—if using Nightly
Sleep (model 1, Table 4) or a dichotomous scoring of SR (see Appendix, Table S2). In general, the magnitude as
well as the significance of each estimated effect is similar, if not greater, using these alternative scorings of sleep
restriction, and so we choose to focus on the measure Personal SD throughout the main text for displaying the
results relative to an easily-understood benchmark of Personal SD = 0 (where someone is getting exactly the
amount of sleep she thinks she needs).
13
That is, subjects were informed prior to making decisions that the risk associated with the first mover decision in
this game was not a function of another individual’s choice in the current experiment group, but rather the
amount “passed back” was a draw from a distribution that reflected typical pass back amounts from previous
experiments. Previous research with social decision tasks has highlighted that behavior with a real human
counterpart may differ from behavior when matched with a computerized or algorithmic counterpart (e.g., Kosfeld
et al., 2005; Krajbich et al., 2009).

13
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additional model in Table 6 (far-right column) where we average the percentage pass-back
decisions over the subset of amounts where at least half the monetary pie is initially trusted.
This evaluates whether sleep restriction impacts trustworthiness differently when the initial
signal of trust is most clear.14 As can be seen in Table 6, sleep restriction significantly decreases
trustworthiness, and the effect is also robust. Moreover, the effect is largest in magnitude and
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estimated with the most precision when evaluating trustworthiness in the face of strong initial
signals of trust. In other words, sleep restriction harms trustworthiness more when the truster
is most vulnerable, which should be concerning. Figure 4 shows that the effect size of the

result in Table 6, column 2, is somewhat smaller than the Dictator or Trust effects of sleep
restriction. Nevertheless, it is a robust result that indicates an approximate 7% reduction in
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trustworthiness over a baseline rate of 33% trustworthiness in response to an additional 2
hours of chronic sleep restriction.15

Given the Trust game results, one might argue that the SR effect of reduced trust is due
to an accurate anticipation of reduced trustworthiness. Our data cannot directly test this, but

M

we reject this interpretation for two reasons: First, the argument is not consistent with the
Ultimatum results—there is at least some marginal evidence that SR increases first-mover

ED

greed (model 2 in Table 3; Table 7 discussed below), and yet there is no predicted change in
MAOs. Second, this interpretation requires anticipation skills that have neural correlates in
brain regions harmed by sleep loss (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009). Dickinson and McElroy (2012)

PT

also showed direct behavioral evidence that decisions requiring such anticipatory skills suffer

CE

from adverse sleep states.16

AC

2.1 Sleep and Circadian mismatch interaction analysis

14

In this case, the strength of the initial trust signal is also significant because more than half the pie initially
trusted implies the first-mover is exposing herself to being exploited by the trustee.
15
Here, the baseline trustworthiness of 33% is the approximate level of predicted trustworthiness for somewhat
who is not sleep restricted (Personal SD = 0), and it also represents the Rate-of-Return breakeven level of
trustworthiness for first-movers to recuperate their initial “investment” given the tripled-investment rule.
16
Results in Tables 3-6, as well as Appendix Table S2, are also robust to the exclusion of extreme sleeper subjects
who were personally sleep deprived > 2.5 hours (SR condition) or < ½ hour (WR condition). Standard errors
increase slightly, though key results are still statistically significant at p < .10 or better. The magnitude of the
estimated effects from removing the more extreme sleepers, not surprisingly, is slightly reduced.

14

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Van Dongen and Dinges (2003) and Burke et al (2015) suggest that sleep and circadian
misalignment may have interactive effects, and other behavioral research has suggested that
adverse sleep states may have cumulative effects (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010). We explore
the possibility of interaction effects in Table 7. Here, we show results of estimations that
include an interaction variable between circadian mismatch (MM=1) and the Personal SD
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variable used previously in the Tables 3-6 specifications. Consistent with these earlier
estimations, significant adverse sleep state effects (on Dictator offers, trust, and

trustworthiness decisions) are linked to Personal SD and not circadian mismatch. One

difference with earlier estimations is that we find subjects with higher Personal SD pass less
money in the trust game even when the second mover is a pass-back algorithm. However, this
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finding should not be considered robust given its absence from other specifications we

estimated. Perhaps surprisingly, Table 7 results show no significant interaction effect on
Personal SD*MM. Thus, our data do not show evidence of a magnified behavioral effect in
subjects who are both sleep restricted and circadian mismatched.17

M

Relatedly, Table 8 shows the mean values and confidence intervals of self-reported
sleepiness by treatment. Table 8 shows that, while both SR and MM significantly increase

ED

sleepiness, it is also clear that the magnitude of the SR effect on sleepiness is larger. The
insignificant behavioral effects of MM we report may therefore be attributed to the fact that
MM does not increase sleepiness as much as SR in our design, which may reflect the more

PT

cumulative effect of nightly chronic partial sleep restriction over the course of an entire week.
Additionally, one can see from Table 8 that self-reported sleepiness for someone in both SR and

CE

MM states is not significantly higher than for someone only in the SR state. While it is unclear
why self-reported sleepiness is not higher when one is both SR and MM, the lack of interaction

AC

effects in the Table 7 analysis is sensible in light of this finding.18
17

Full marginal effects of a change in MM and Personal SD (PSD) on each treatment variable are given, in general,
by MM+(PSD*MM)*PSD and PSD+(PSD*MM)*MM, respectively (evaluated at the mean levels of the treatment
variables). However, the coefficients on the interaction term, (PSD*MM), is statistically insignificant in every
instance. Our focus is therefore on the main effect of each treatment variable on our behavioral outcomes
measures.
18
It is possible that subjects in a condition of both SR and MM took countermeasures to counteract sleepiness
(other than naps, which would contribute to noncompliance). However, the one item on which we collected
countermeasure data during the decision session—whether caffeine or sugar was consumed in the 3 hours prior to

15
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2.2 Sleepiness as a mediating variable
Because our manipulations were intended to increase sleepiness, we also evaluate
whether sleepiness is the primary mediator of these results (Tables 9 and 10). For the two-step
estimation we first regress the Karolinska sleepiness scores (KSS) on demographics, session, and
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sleep variables (Table 9). As noted earlier, both SR and circadian mismatch significantly predict
higher KSS (p < .01), which is seen in the first stage estimation results. This provides validation
for our treatment manipulations and identifies the variation in KSS due to subject-specific
factors as well.19

Step two used the predicted KSS values as a covariate (instrument) in the main decision
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outcome estimations. Table 10 estimates indicate that higher levels of the KSS-instrument
predict lower levels of ultimatum proposals, dictator altruism, trust, and trustworthiness.
These estimates indicate that our experimental treatments alter behavioral outcomes through
their impact on sleepiness. They also highlight that circadian mismatch, while not estimated to

M

directly impact behavioral outcomes, is estimated to indirectly affect social behavior via its
impact on sleepiness. In conjunction with our other analysis represented in Tables 3-6, these

ED

results describe a common theme whereby prosocial decisions decline due to sleepiness that is

3. Discussion

PT

symptomatic of an adverse sleep or circadian state.

We examined the impact of mild but chronic sleep restriction and suboptimal circadian

CE

timing on decisions in simple social interactions. The sleep levels studied and the times-of-day
utilized are highly relevant to what a large segment of the population experiences in everyday

AC

life. Because we utilized an ecologically valid setting, and compensatory strategies to combat

the lab session—did not show significant differences across individual or combined sleep conditions (see Appendix
Table S1). These data are, however, not precise in terms of standardized size and caffeine/sugar content—we used
simple count data on self-reported caffeine/sugar consumption prior to the session as a 0/1 variable).
19
We also note that the impact of gender is implicit in these results. First-stage estimates show that female
subjects are significantly sleepier, controlling for other demographics and sleep variables.
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the sleepiness were not prohibited, our results can be viewed as conservative estimates of the
impact of common sleep states in the simple games we examined.
The simple social decision tasks we used are well-known and they form the building
blocks of more complex interactive environments where social behaviors loom large. We found
robust results consistent with the hypothesis that commonly experienced adverse sleep states
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reduce prosocial behaviors. Our results showing reduced dictator giving are the most precisely
estimated, although trust and trustworthiness are also found to decrease significantly in most
specifications. We hypothesized that adverse sleep states would likely reduce prosocial

behaviors due to their tendency to reduce deliberative thought. While we do not have direct
evidence that our sleep and circadian manipulations impacted prefrontal activation, a body of

AN
US

literature in sleep science clearly links more extreme adverse sleep states (e.g., total sleep
deprivation) to disproportionate reductions in PFC activation, as well as altered emotional
response region activation. For example, sleepy subjects may experience increased fear of
betrayal as a mechanism that results in reduced trust, as was proposed in an earlier study

M

(Anderson and Dickinson, 2010). While suggestive, we also note that our sleep restriction
manipulation produced the same general behavioral effects as others have found in patients

ED

with vmPFC damage (Krajbich et al., 2009). Future research may wish to document the impact
of these more mild sleep/circadian manipulations on neural activation patterns in order to
establish direct evidence for the mechanism that drives this behavioral result.

PT

Our findings imply that commonly experienced adverse sleep states reduce prosocial
behaviors and lead to unrealized gains in simple social interactions. A reduction in an

CE

individual’s social capital has multiplier effects, and so any factor that can be shown to reduce
prosocial behavior is noteworthy. One of the main criticisms of recent work identifying the

AC

decline in social capital in America (Putman, 1995) is the fact that many of the arguments are
based on correlational data (see critique in Sobel, 2002). While we do not claim to have
uncovered the hidden source of decreased social capital during recent decades, we do stand on
firmer ground in claiming at least one micro-level causal determinant of reduced prosocial
behavior in these simple environments.
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3.1 Conclusions
Given the prevalence of social interactions in everyday life, it should be concerning to
identify that sleep restriction adversely impacts prosocial behavior. This research helps show
that a common trend in current adult sleep habits may not just affect decision outcomes, but it
also may undermine the potential to generate value in interpersonal interactions and possibly
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reduce social capital multiplier effects. Such social “inefficiency” costs of sleepiness are not
fully appreciated and largely ignored. Future research should seek to evaluate whether these
effects are also robust to repeated, longer-term, or non-anonymous interactions. In the

meantime, it seems like a piece of timely advice for encouraging prosocial behavior would be to
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tell everyone to “just sleep on it”.

M
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Table 1
Sample Size Per Design Cell (treatment subjects)
Morning Session

Evening Session

Morning-type

34 (30)

38 (28)

Evening-type

39 (30)

38 (31)

AN
US

Notes: Circadian mismatches cells shaded
Table reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016)
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Sample size = 149 subjects
Matched obs = 76, Mismatched obs = 73
(compliant & sleep data intact shown in parenthesis)
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Table 2: Behavioral Summary Statistics and nonparametric treatment effect tests
(sample is n=119 compliant treatment subjects. Data pooled across sessions and subjects)
Trust
Trust
TrustUlt $$
Ult $$
Dictator person Distribution worthiness
Variable
Offer
MAO
$$ Offer $$ Offer
$$ Offer
% passback
4.49
2.87
3.44
5.19
4.62
.274
SR=0
(1.04)
(1.77)
(2.00)
(2.47)
(2.58)
(.147)
4.42
2.89
3.02
4.77
4.56
.261
SR=1
(1.01)
(1.82)
(2.24)
(2.27)
(2.49)
(.146)
Signed-Rank
Z= -0.57
Z= -0.14
Z= -1.80 Z= -1.65
Z= -0.09
Z= -0.59
(Matched)
p=.57
p =.88
p =.07
p =.10
p =.93
p =.56
4.42
2.77
3.33
5.04
4.43
.268
MM=0
(1.04)
(1.75)
(2.01)
(2.34)
(2.42)
(.137)
4.49
3.00
3.13
4.92
4.86
.267
MM=1
(1.02)
(1.84)
(2.25)
(2.43)
(2.63)
(.156)
Mann-Whitney
Z= -0.08
Z= -0.69
Z= 0.69
Z= 0.93
Z= -1.14
Z= 0.24
(Unmatched)
p =.93
p =.49
p =.49
p =.35
p -.25
p =.80

AC

Note: Significance levels are for 2-tailed tests. Test on SR treatment effect use matched data, whereas MM effect
tests use unmatched data on each subject’s average behavioral effect across both decision sessions. Alternative
nonparametric tests (Sign test of SR effect; Median test of MM effect) produce similar results. For those SR effects
on Dictator Offers and Trust decision, which had p≤.10 for the 2-tailed signed-rank test, the corresponding p-values
of the Sign (binomial) test are p=.13, and p=.05, respectively.
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Table 3: Ultimatum Decisions
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample)
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie offered to 2nd-mover
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Minimum Acceptable Offer
(n=236 obs)
(3)
(4)
Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error)
4.71 (1.01)***
4.70 (.94)***
-.61 (.31)**
-.62 (.31)**
-.08 (.04)**
-.08 (.04)**
.02 (.21)
.02 (.21)
.06 (.07)
.06 (.07)
-.03 (.04)
-.03 (.04)
-.59 (.13)***
-.59 (.13)***
.47 (.30)
.47 (.30)
.02 (.03)
.02 (.03)
.11 (.30)
.11 (.30)
-.00003 (.001)
----.00001 (.001)
31.68***
31.75***

AN
US

Variable
Constant
Female (=1)
Age
Depression score
Anxiety score
Epworth score
Session #3
Morning Session (=1)
Morningness Score
Circadian Mismatched (=1)
Nightly Sleep (minutes)
Personal SD (min/night)
Wald chi-squared test (10)

Ultimatum Offers
(n=234 obs)
(1)
(2)
Coef (st. error)
Coef (st. error)
4.70 (.60)***
5.29 (.54)***
-.29 (.18)
-.27 (.18)
-.02 (.02)
-.02 (.02)
.10 (.12)
.11 (.12)
-.02 (.04)
-.02 (.04)
-.01 (.03)
-.01 (.03)
-.18 (.09)**
-.18 (.09)**
.10 (.17)
.10 (.17)
.01 (.02)
.01 (.02)
.02 (.17)
-.004 (.17)
.001 (.001)
-----.0014 (.0007)**
9.43
12.32
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Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test
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Table 4: Dictator Decisions
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample)
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie offered to 2nd-mover
Dictator Offers
(n=237 obs)
(1)
(2)
Variable
Coef (st. error)
Coef (st. error)
Constant
1.39 (1.22)***
3.96 (1.05)***
Female (=1)
-.03 (.36)
.06 (.35)
Age
-.01 (.04)
-.02 (.04)
Depression score
-.23 (.23)
-.18 (.23)
Anxiety score
.11 (.08)
.10 (.08)
Epworth score
.06 (.05)
.06 (.05)
Session #3
-.71 (.20)***
-.72 (.20)***
Morning Session (=1)
.29 (.34)
.31 (.33)
Morningness Score
-.01 (.03)
-.02 (.03)
Circadian Mismatched (=1)
-.22 (.34)
-.32 (.33)
Nightly Sleep (minutes)
.004 (.002)**
--Personal SD (min/night)
---.005 (.002)***
Wald chi-squared test (10)
23.02***
29.36***

M

Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test

ED

Table 5: Trust Decisions
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample)
Dependent Variable= Portion of $10 pie trusted to 2nd-mover

PT

Trust person (Social)
(n=230 obs)
(1)
(2)
Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error)
3.91 (1.39)*** 6.51 (1.18)***
-.33 (.40)
-.24 (.39)
-.01 (.04)
-.01 (.04)
-.27 (.26)
-.23 (.26)
.10 (.09)
.09 (.09)
.01 (.06)
.01 (.06)
-.64 (.25)***
-.63 (.25)**
.26 (.38)
.27 (.38)
-.06 (.04)
-.06 (.04)
-.13 (.37)
-.21 (.37)
.005 (.002)**
-----.004 (.002)**
15.44
16.07*
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Variable
Constant
Female (=1)
Age
Depression score
Anxiety score
Epworth score
Session #3
Morning Session (=1)
Morningness Score
Circadian Mismatched (=1)
Nightly Sleep (minutes)
Personal SD (min/night)
Wald chi-squared test (10)

Trust algorithm (Asocial)
(n=236 obs)
(3)
(4)
Coef (st. error) Coef (st. error)
4.48 (1.48)*** 5.40 (1.28)***
-.47 (.43)
-.45 (.42)
.01 (.05)
.01 (.05)
-.39 (.28)
-.36 (.28)
.10 (.09)
.09 (.09)
-.03 (.06)
-.03 (.06)
-.02 (.25)
-.04 (.25)
-.32 (.41)
-.31 (.40)
-.02 (.04)
-.03 (.04)
.52 (.40)
.47 (.40)
.001 (.002)
-----.003 (.002)
6.91
8.58

Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test
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Table 6: Trustworthiness Decisions
Random effects GLS regression (for full sample)
Dependent Variable= average % returned (from strategy choice set)
DV = Avg
Trustworthiness
over all amounts
trusted

DV = Avg
Trustworthiness
for amounts ≥ $5
trusted

(1)
Coef (st. error)
.19 (.09)**
-.01 (.03)
.001 (.003)
-.02 (.02)
.005 (.006)
.001 (.004)
-.04 (.01)***
.001 (.03)
-.001 (.002)
.0004 (.02)
.0002 (.0001)*
--12.84

(2)
Coef (st. error)
.31 (.08)***
-.003 (.03)
.0001 (.003)
-.02 (.02)
.005 (.006)
.001 (.004)
-.04 (.01)***
.002 (.02)
-.002 (.002)
-.004 (.02)
---.0002 (.0001)**
15.60

(3)
Coef (st. error)
.41 (.08)***
-.02 (.03)
-.001 (.003)
-.02 (.02)
.008 (.006)
.001 (.004)
-.03 (.01)***
.01 (.03)
-.002 (.003)
-.01 (.03)
---.0003 (.0001)***
18.24**
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Variable
Constant
Female (=1)
Age
Depression score
Anxiety score
Epworth score
Session #3
Morning Session (=1)
Morningness Score
Circadian Mismatched (=1)
Nightly Sleep (minutes)
Personal SD (min/night)
Wald chi-squared test (10)

DV = Avg
Trustworthiness
over all amounts
trusted

AN
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(n=234 obs)
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Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test
Model 3 shows that Personal SD more strongly impacts trustworthiness when a strong initial trust signal is
received.
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Table 7: Analysis of Sleep Restriction and Circadian Mismatch Interaction Effects
Random effects GLS regressions
Standard errors clustered on subject in parenthesis (2 observations per subject)
Trust
Trust
TrustUlt $$
Ult $$
Dictator
person
Distribution worthiness^
Variable
Offer
MAO
$$ Offer
$$ Offer
$$ Offer
% passback
5.26
4.65
4.03
6.54
5.70
.31
Constant
(.54)***
(.95)***
(1.06)*** (1.20)***
(1.30)***
(.08)***
-.27
-.62
.06
-.24
-.43
-.003
Female (=1)
(.18)
(.32)**
(.34)
(.39)
(.42)
(.03)
-.02
-.08
-.02
-.01
.01
.0002
Age
(.02)
(.04)**
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
(.003)
.11
.02
-.18
-.23
-.35
-.02
Depression score
(.12)
(.21)
(.23)
(.26)
(.28)
(.02)
-.02
.06
.10
.09
.09
.005
Anxiety score
(.03)
(.07)
(.08)
(.09)
(.09)
(.006)
-.01
-.03
.06
.01
-.03
.001
Epworth score
(.03)
(.04)
(.05)
(.06)
(.06)
(.004)
-.19
-.59
-.72
-.63
-.03
-.04
Session #3
(.09)**
(.13)***
(.20)***
(.25)**
(.25)
(.01)***
Morning Session
.11
.48
.30
.27
-.39
.003
(=1)
(.18)
(.30)
(.33)
(.38)
(.41)
(.02)
Morningness
.01
.02
-.02
-.06
-.03
-.002
Score
(.02)
(.03)
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.002)
.06
.19
-.43
-.27
-.13
.0001
MM (=1)
(.22)
(.37)
(.45)
(.53)
(.55)
(.03)
-.001
.0004
-.006
-.005
-.005
-.0002
Personal SD
(.001)
(.001)
(.002)***
(.003)*
(.003)**
(.0001)*
-.001
-.001
.001
.001
.006
-.00004
Personal SD*MM
(.001)
(.002)
(.003)
(.004)
(.004)
(.0002)
N
234
236
237
230
236
234
12.50
31.75***
29.35***
16.03
10.96
15.58
Wald 2 (11)
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Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.
^
Estimation of the Trustworthiness model using the alternative dependent variable of average returned amount
when 50% or more of pie is trusted shows that the Personal SD reduced trustworthiness when high levels of trust
are at stake ( = -.0003, p <.05), and there is no significant effect of MM or the Personal SD*MM interaction.

Table 8: Karolinska Sleepiness Score (KSS) by Condition
Treatment
Combination
SR=0 & MM=0
SR=1 & MM=0
SR=0 & MM=1
SR=1 & MM=1

KSS
Mean
3.934
6.621
5.018
6.473

Robust St Errors
(clustered on subj)
.173
.193
.243
.218

[95% CI]
[3.591, 4.278]
[6.234, 7.002]
[4.535, 5.500]
[6.041, 6.906]

Note: self-reported sleepiness is based on average KSS from each
decision session (measures taken at beginning and end of the session).
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Table 9: Instrumental Variables Estimation to examine sleepiness mediating effects. First-stage
estimation of determinants of self-reported sleepiness.
1st-Stage Regression (errors clustered on subject)
KSleepy estimated using following instruments: Demographic/Session variables: Session#3, Female, Age,
Anxiety Score, Depression Score, Morning Session, Epworth Score. rMEQ score, Personal SD, Mismatch

Predictors of KSleepy : Coefficient (st error)
Demographic/Session Indicators
-.365 (.225)
.877 (.245)***
.048 (.021)**
-.040 (.047)
-.282 (.155)*
-.649 (.208)***

Epworth Score:
rMEQ score:
Personal SD:
Mismatch:

.073 (.035)**
.008 (.022)
.010 (.001)***
.865 (.212)***
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Session#3:
Female:
Age:
Anxiety Score:
Depression Score:
Morning Session:

Sleep Related Variables
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Model F – test (10 , 226) = 10.86***
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Experimental treatment variables Personal SD and Mismatch both are estimated to significantly increase selfreported sleepiness (p < .01). Minor differences in number of observations across tasks (e.g., small number of
nd
blank responses) are noted in 2 -stage regression N below. This implies minor differences in estimated
st
st
coefficients and standard errors for the 1 -stage regression equations. Shown above are the 1 -stage results of
the Dictator game model, which are similar in sign and significance to all other 1-stage equations.
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Table 10: Instrumental Variables Estimations to examine sleepiness mediating effects. Second-stage
estimations of behavioral outcomes using instrumented values of self-reported sleepiness.
2nd-Stage Regression: KSleepy instrumented from 1st-stage regression
Standard errors clustered on subject (2 observations per subject)
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Trust
Trust
TrustUltimatum $$
Ultimatum
Dictator
person
algorithm
worthiness
Variable
Offer
$$ MAO
$$ Offer
$$ Offer
$$ Offer
% passback
-.17
-.04
-.46
-.35
-.17
-.02
KSleepy(instr)
(.08)**
(13)
(.16)***
(.16)**
(.17)
(.01)**
-.25
-.60
-.88
-.79
-.10
-.04
Session #3
(.10)**
(.14)***
(.22)***
(.27)***
(.25)
(.02)***
-.13
-.59
.42
-.002
-.41
.01
Female
(.15)
(.31)*
(.37)
(.04)
(.45)
(.03)
-.01
-.06
-.02
-.02
-.005
.0001
age
(.02)
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.002)
Depression
.06
.002
-.30
-.27
-.34
-.02
score
(.09)
(.19)
(.22)
(.27)
(.28)
(.02)
-.03
.05
.12
.10
.09
.005
Anxiety score
(.03)
(.07)
(.07)
(.07)
(.07)
(.005)
5.91
4.83
5.93
7.44
5.75
.38
Constant
(.71)***
(1.19)***
(1.31)***
(1.22)**
(1.27)***
(.09)***
N
234
236
237
230
236
234
2
10.42
30.97***
25.45***
12.19*
5.89
11.91*
Wald 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.
The same 2SLS model run using the alternative Trustworthiness variable (i.e., average percentage passed back on
all possible first-mover trusted amounts of at least half the pie), shows similar results to the Trustworthiness
model above, except that the magnitude of the instrumented KSleepy variable is slightly larger in magnitude (-.023
vs -.019) and estimated a bit more precisely (p = .03 vs p = .038). This is consistent with what we report in the text
that the impact of sleep restriction (here, via the mediating variable, KSleepy) to reduce trustworthiness is
somewhat magnified for those decisions involving a more sizeable and clear signal of trust by the first-mover.
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FIGURE 1: Protocol Details and Timeline
SR treatment week = prescribed 5-6 hr/night in bed attempting to sleep, naps discouraged. Sleep diaries kept.
WR treatment week = prescribed 8-9 hr/night in bed attempting to sleep, naps discouraged. Sleep diaries kept.
Ad lib sleep week = subject sleep however much/little they like. Sleep diaries kept.
Sessions: Subjects come to research lab in each instance.
Ad Lib Sleep Week
(washout)

Week #1

Week #2

Opposite Treatment
Week (WR or SR)

Week #3
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Treatment Week
(SR or WR)

Session 1

Session 2

No Session

7:30 am
or
10:00 pm
Informed Consent,
Sleep watch/diary
instructions

7:30 am
or
10:00 pm
Decision
Experiments

Note: morning or evening session time
Randomly assigned, but remained
constant across sessions

7:30 am
or
10:00 pm
Decision
Experiments

M

AN
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Note: Figure reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016)

Session 3

ED

Figure 2: Predicted Dictator Offers (Altruism)
Dictator Altruism

compliant treatment subjects (n=237, 2
obs per subject)

CE

-140

AC

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

PT

Offer
(of $10 pie)

0

slope p ≤ .01

180

340

Personal SD (min/night week prior)

NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 4 with levels of all statistically
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects. Results show that when
dictators are more chronically sleep restricted, they are less altruistic.
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Figure 3: Predicted Trust Levels
Trust Levels (amount trusted)

Trusted $$
(of $10 pie)

Non-human trust

slope not significant p > .10

Human trust
slope p ≤ .05

-140

0

180

340

Personal SD (min/night week prior)
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7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

compliant treatment subjects (n=230, 2
obs per subject)

slope p ≤ .01

CE

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Trustworthiness (% returned)
compliant treatment subjects (n=234, 2
obs per subject)

PT

% returned
(avg of all
possibilities)

ED

Figure 4: Predicted Trustworthiness

M
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NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 5 with levels of all statistically
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects. Results show that when
subjects are more chronically sleep restricted, they trust less of the $10 pie.
nd
Non-human trust line shows predicted trust when 2 -mover is known to be
an automatic pass-back algorithm as opposed to another subject. Trusted
amounts in non-human trust are not significantly affected by Personal SD.

AC

-140

0

180

340

Personal SD (min/night week prior)

NOTES: Forecast derived from Table 6 with levels of all statistically
insignificant variables set to zero. Fig. shows range of values of Personal SD
observed in sample of compliant treatment subjects. Results show that when
subjects are more chronically sleep restricted, they are less trustworthy.
(i.e., average % of pie returned is lower).
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APPENDIX A (Data and Analysis)
Sleep Data Acquisition

CR
IP
T

Actigraphy data acquisition (Actiwatch Spectrum Plus devices; Philips Respironics) was at 30-second
time epochs. Each epoch is initially scored as “sleep” or “wake” with manufacturer’s software. Rest
period start/end times are then adjusted manually, if necessary, using subject-entered actigraph event
markers and with the input of complementary sleep diaries. All manual scoring is conducted using
validated scoring protocols (Goldman et al, 2007).
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The devices use an MEMS type accelerometer and sample data at 32 Hz. Devices are waterproof at 1m
for 30 minutes and so subjects were instructed to wear them 24 hr a day during the 3-week protocol,
except for the exceptional removal to avoid device damage (e.g., contact sports, working with
chemicals, etc). Battery life at 30-second data sampling epochs is over 30 days and so subjects had no
concerns with battery life or device recharge.
Sample Information
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A comprehensive analysis of attrition, compliance, and validation of the protocol in generating
significant differences in sleepiness can be found in Dickinson et al (2016). A total of 256 subjects were
recruited for the study. Of these, 35 (14%) failed to show up for Session 1, and of the remaining 221
subjects, 184 completed the protocol (n=30 control subjects, n=154 treatment subjects). Higher
depression risk scores on the primary care PHQ-2 screening questionnaire (Kroenke, Spitzer, and
Williams, 2003) predict a lower likelihood of showing up for the first study session (after recruitment
signup), and they additionally predict a lower likelihood of completing the protocol conditional on
showing up for the first session. Higher scores on the anxiety disorder risk screener GAD-7 (Spitzer et al,
2006) predict an increased likelihood of completing the protocol, conditional on starting the protocol
(i.e., showing up for the first study session). It should be noted that scores on these two primary care
screening questionnaires have some predictive power regarding selection and attrition in our sample,
even though subjects surpassing the standard primary care cutoff for risk of depressive or anxiety
disorder were not recruited at all. In other words, the variation in the screener score results within the
“safe zone” (i.e., below the cutoff that typically generates follow-up screening for these disorders)
explains some of the final sample qualities. For this result, these screener scores are included in the
main statistical analysis as a way to account for their potential effects on behavioral outcomes via their
impact on predicting protocol completion. The only other demographic or session control variable
predicting study completion was Morning Session, where we find that subjects randomly assigned to a
morning session group were more likely to finish the protocol conditional on starting the protocol.
Of the 184 subjects completing the study, actigraphy malfunction caused the loss of data on a few
subjects, such that we have 179 subjects (n=30 control subjects, n=149 treatment subjects) of complete
actigraphy data. Using our standard for compliance for treatment subjects, which requires a subject to
have at least a ≥ 60 minutes difference between nightly sleep during the well-rested compared to sleeprestricted weeks, we have 119 compliant treatment subjects—a compliance rate of about 80% (n=30
control subjects were 100% compliant). Figure S1 shows the average nightly sleep levels based on
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Figure S1: Nightly Sleep Averages (actigraphy measured)
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scored actigraphy data for the treatment versus control subjects for the different weeks of the protocol.
Figure S2 shows the distribution of differences (WR-SR) of nightly sleep amounts for the treatment
versus control subjects. As can be seen from Fig. S2, a compliance standard of a treatment week
difference of at least 60 min/night sleep is statistically sound. That is, a subject drawn at random from
our study who has at least this 60 min difference between nightly sleep amounts in the two treatment
weeks is unlikely to have been drawn from the control subject sample (see distribution overlap points).

Average Nightly Sleep (Actigraphy Measured)
Control Subjects

0

ED

100

M

200

300
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per night
Min400

Treatment Subjects

Ad Lib Week
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SR Week (or Week 1 WR in Controls)
WR Week (or Week 3 WR in Controls)

34

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Figure S2: Sleep difference distributions (control vs. treatment subjects)
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Avg = 0.05 ± 25.87
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Avg = 92.65 ± 40.44
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Control (Week 1 minus Week 3) Sleep
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Note: Figure reproduced from Dickinson et al (2016)
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In the main text, we report significant increases in subjective sleepiness as a result of both the sleep
restriction and circadian mismatch manipulations. There is some evidence that the overall effectiveness
of the manipulation is stronger regarding the sleep restriction manipulation, compared to the circadian
mismatch manipulation. This claim is substantiated from data on a subset of n=80 of our subjects for
whom we administered the PANAS instrument to measure positive and negative affective states
(Watson et al, 1988). Sleep restriction is found to significantly increase subject self-reported irritability
and decrease self-reported alertness. The same is not true of the circadian mismatch manipulation as
there is no estimated difference in these mood states resulting from the mismatch manipulation.,

CE

We also collected self-report data on caffeine and/or sugar consumption in the 3 hours prior to the lab
session, scored as a dichotomous variable as equal to 1 without regard to quantity of either as specific
quantities were not elicited. Table S1 below shows no evidence of significant differences in either items
as a function of sleep condition, though the mean level is somewhat higher in the SR=1 MM=0 data.
Table S1: Self-report Caffeine and/or Sugar consumption (Caf/Sug=1)
Treatment
Caf/Sug
Robust St Errors
Combination
Mean
(clustered on subj)
[95% CI]
SR=0 & MM=0
.328
.060
[208, .447]
SR=1 & MM=0
.403
.063
[.279, .527]
SR=0 & MM=1
.333
.063
[.209, .458]
SR=1 & MM=1
.339
.064
[.213, .465]
Note: self-reported caffeine and/or sugar consumption is elicited at the
beginning of the decision session.

AC

Frequency

Average Nightly Actigraphy Sleep Differences (Weeks 1 & 3)
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Statistical Analysis: Additional Estimations
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Table S2 below shows results from estimations that using only a dichotomous scoring of sleeprestriction (SR=1 or 0). In general, the results are similar to what is reported in the text using the more
informative continuous measure of sleep restriction, though significance is reduced as one would
expect. The trustworthiness result is only significant when considering how SR impacts trustworthiness
in the fact of high initial trust levels, which is again consistent with estimations reported in the main
text.
Table S2: Key Outcome Estimations with categorical variables only for experimental manipulation (along
with controls for morningness/eveningness preference, session time-of-day, and session number)

Trust
Distribution
$$ Offer
-.076
(.249)
.521
(.396)
-.288
(.396)
-.024
(.036)
-.014
(.249)
4.818
(.583)***
236
2.84
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ED
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Random effects GLS regressions
Standard errors clustered on subject (2 observations per subject)
Trust
Ultimatum Ultimatum
Dictator
person
Variable
$$ Offer
$$ MAO
$$ Offer
$$ Offer
SR (=1)
-.084
-.019
-.491
-.476
(.088)
(.131)
(.199)**
(.248)*
MM (=1)
.077
.234
-.217
-.119
(.170)
(.300)
(.333)
(.363)
Morning
.079
.362
.284
.273
Session (=1)
(.169)
(.300)
(.333)
(.363)
MEQ score
.0007
-.012
-.016
-.053
(higher=MT)
(.015)
(.027)
(.030)
(.033)
-.175
-.590
-.704
-.622
Session #3 (=1)
(.088)**
(.131)***
(.199)***
(.248)**
4.503
2.044
3.994
6.102
Constant Term
(.245)***
(.429)***
(.488)*** (.537)***
N
234
236
237
230
5.05
22.60***
18.40***
11.91**
Wald 2

Trustworthiness^
% passback
-.017
(.013)
-.001
(.024)
.003
(.024)
-.001
(.002)
-.037
(.013)***
.303
(.035)***
234
9.36*

AC

CE

Notes: *,**, *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, for the 2-tailed test.
^
Estimation of the Trustworthiness model using the alternative dependent variable of returned amounts when
50% or more of pie is trusted shows that the sleep restriction treatment reduced trustworthiness when high levels
of trust are at stake ( = -.024, p <.05).
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Finally, we present a graphical depiction of the trustworthiness results for the reader to compare
outcomes with the return amount that would equate payoffs versus the return amount that would
generate a zero rate of return (ROR) for the truster. As can been seen in Figures S3, the impact of SD or
MM on pass-back levels is to reduce them. The Figures highlight how pass-back levels, overall, approach
payoff equality levels for the higher initial trust levels.
Figure S3: Trustworthiness Distributions (by sleep condition)
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Average Pass-Back %
(by SD condition: pooled subjects)

% returned
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
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SD=0

0.25

SD=1

0.2

Payoff Equal

0.15

ROR=0

0.1

$1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00 $7.00 $8.00 $9.00 $10.00

M

Amount Trusted

Average Pass-Back %
(by MM condition: pooled sessions)

% returned

ED

0.5
0.45
0.4

PT

0.35
0.3

MM=0
MM=1

CE

0.25
0.2

Payoff Equal

0.15

AC

0.1

ROR=0

$1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00 $7.00 $8.00 $9.00 $10.00

Amount Trusted

Notes: This Fig. S3 does not control for other variables or take into account the repeat-administration nature of
the data and is for illustrative purposes only. ROR is the rate-of-return on the first-mover’s investment or amount
trusted. Because the experimenter triples whatever amount is initially trusted, a one-third trustworthiness level
will return back the invested capital to the first-mover. The Payoff Equal amount takes into account that only the
first-mover is endowed with the initial $10 to trust or not. For example, if all $10 is trusted, then the secondmover possesses $30 (and the first mover possesses zero). The second-mover will have to send back 50% to
guarantee equal payoffs of $15 for each.
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APPENDIX B (Task Instructions)
INSTRUCTIONS (Common to all 4 Decision Environments)
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Rounds and Matchings: Each Decision Environment is a one-round decision experiment, in
which you will be randomly matched with an anonymous counterpart. You will never know who
your counterpart is in this experiment.
Roles: There are two roles in each Decision Environment. One of the roles is the initial decision
maker or “first mover”, and the other role is the responder or “second mover”.
Decisions for each role: We will ask you to make a decision for both roles in each Decision
Environment. In fact, you will not know which role you are assigned in the Decision
Environment that is randomly chosen for pay until after all decisions are made. Thus, at the
time of making your decisions you do not know whether you will end up being the first mover or
second mover in this task.
Only one Decision Environment will count: Once all decisions have been made (both first
mover and second mover decisions) by all subjects, decision sheets for this task will be
collected. At the end of today’s session, the experimenters will then randomly choose one of
the four Decision Environments to count for pay. There is an equal chance that any of the four
Decision Environments will be selected for pay.
Random counterpart assignment: Once a Decision Environment is randomly chosen, the
experimenters will also randomly match subjects to form anonymous pairs. The identities of
these assignments will not be revealed to either subject.
Random role assignment: Once pairs have been randomly assigned, the experimenters will also
randomly assign one subject in the pair to be the first-mover, and the other subject will be the
second-mover.
Payment at end of Session: For the Decision Environment randomly chosen for pay, you and
your counterpart’s decision in your randomly assigned roles will determine your payoff for this
task. This payoff will not affect your payoffs from any other part of the experiment.
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This experiment task involves a series of decisions between you and a randomly chosen counterpart
from your experiment group. There are 4 different “Decision Environments” in which you must make
decisions. When all decisions have been completed, only one of the Decision Environments will be
chosen (at random) and used for actual payoff based on you and your counterpart’s decision. The
counterpart with whom you are randomly matched for this task will remain anonymous to you, and you
will remain anonymous to him/her. Below, we will describe the common features of each of the 4
Decision Environments. The decision sheets that follow will then present the unique details of each
Decision Environment and your choices for each environment are made on those sheets.

(Instructions for the 4 decision environments follow. Note to Readers: Decision Environments 1, 2, 3,
and 4 are the Ultimatum, Dictator, Trust (human), and Trust (algorithm) tasks, respectively).
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #1
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First Mover Decision: You must propose a division of $10 between you and your randomly
chosen counterpart. Choices can be made in $.25 increments, and any proposal is allowed as long as the
amount you keep plus the amount the second-mover receives sum to $10. In this Decision Environment
#1, the second-mover may choose to either accept or reject your proposal (and rejection implies you
will both get a zero payoff).
DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER
If randomly assigned as the first-mover in Decision Environment #1 (and Decision Environment
#1 is chosen to count for real payoffs), then your decision here, along with the responder’s decision, will
determine your payoff.
I propose to divide the $10 as follows:

I keep=

The second-mover receives=
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*********************************************************************************
DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER
You must indicate whether to accept or reject each of the possible proposals that could be made
by the first-mover. Please make an “Accept” or “Reject” choice for each and every possibility in the
Table below. Your decision for a particular proposal will determine your actual payoff (and the firstmover’s payoff) should this Decision Environment be selected to count for real payoffs and you are
assigned as the second-mover.
Proposal amount
My choice
Proposal amount
My choice
(i.e., the amount you would
A=accept
(i.e., the amount you would
A=accept
receive out of the $10 amount)
R=reject
receive out of the $10 amount)
R=reject
$0.00
$5.25
$.25
$5.50
$.50
$5.75
$.75
$6.00
$1.00
$6.25
$1.25
$6.50
$1.50
$6.75
$1.75
$7.00
$2.00
$7.25
$2.25
$7.50
$2.50
$7.75
$2.75
$8.00
$3.00
$8.25
$3.25
$8.50
$3.50
$8.75
$3.75
$9.00
$4.00
$9.25
$4.25
$9.50
$4.50
$9.75
$4.75
$10.00
$5.00
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #2
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First Mover Decision: You must propose a division of $10 between you and your randomly
chosen counterpart. Choices can be made in $.25 increments, and any proposal is allowed as long as the
amount you keep plus the amount the second-mover receives sum to $10. In this Decision Environment
#2, the second-mover must accept your proposal (i.e., it cannot be rejected).

DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER

If randomly assigned as the first-mover in Decision Environment #2 (and Decision Environment
#2 is chosen to count for real payoffs), then your decision here, along with the responder’s decision, will
determine your payoff.
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I propose to divide the $10 as follows:

I keep=

The second-mover receives=

M

*********************************************************************************

DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER
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In Decision Environment #2, the second-mover has no choice to make and must simply accept
the first-mover’s decision.
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #3

DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER
If I am assigned to be the first mover in this task, I choose to
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First Mover Decision: You start this experiment with $10. You must now choose how much (if
any) of this amount to keep and how much (if any) if this amount to pass to the second-mover. Choices
can be made in $.50 increments. Whatever amount is passed to the second-mover will be TRIPLED by
the experimenter. The second-mover will be given a choice of how much, if any, of the tripled amount
he/she wishes to pass back to the first-mover. Your pass/keep decision will be binding should you be
assigned the role of first-mover and Decision Environment #3 is randomly chosen for payment.

KEEP=

AN
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PASS=

********************************************************************************
DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER

ED
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If the first-mover decides to pass any amount from the initial $10.00 dollars along to you, this amount is
multiplied by 3. At this point, you must then decide how much (if any) to pass back to the first mover.
Whatever you do not pass back is yours to keep and would be your experimental earnings in this
Decision Environment #3. Please decide (below) how much (if any) to pass back for each of the possible
first-mover decisions below. Your pass/keep decision for any particular contingency will be binding
should you be assigned the role of second-mover and should Decision Environment #3 be randomly
chosen for payment.
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Amount received by second
mover
(i.e., the amount passed by the
first mover multiplied by 3)
$0.00
$1.50
$3.00
$4.50
$6.00
$7.50
$9.00
$10.50
$12.00
$13.50

I (second
mover)
choose to
pass back

Amount received by second
mover
(i.e., the amount passed by the
first mover multiplied by 3)
$15.00
$16.50
$18.00
$19.50
$21.00
$22.50
$24.00
$25.50
$27.00
$28.50
$30.00

I (second
mover)
choose to
pass back
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DECISION ENVIRONMENT #4
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First Mover Decision: You start this experiment with $10. You must now choose how much (if
any) of this amount to keep and how much (if any) if this amount to pass to the second-mover. Choices
can be made in $.50 increments. Whatever amount is passed to the second-mover will be TRIPLED by
the experimenter. The second-mover will be given a choice of how much, if any, of the tripled amount
he/she wishes to pass back to the first-mover. Your pass/keep decision will be binding should you be
assigned the role of first-mover and Decision Environment #3 is randomly chosen for payment.
*In Decision Environment #4, the second-mover is a computerized choice algorithm (i.e., not a
real person). The computerized choice will mechanically choose an amount to pass back to the firstmover. The computerized (mechanical) choice is based on the distribution of actual pass-back
amounts for each of the possible amounts below, as derived from real human decisions.

M

DECISION TO MAKE AS FIRST-MOVER
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(In other words, the computerized pass-back amount will never be an amount that a human
subject has never chosen, amounts rarely passed back by human subjects will be rarely passed back by
the computerized second-mover, and the amounts most often passed-back by human subjects are most
likely to be passed back by the computerized second-mover—this is true for each of the different firstmover choice contingencies)

KEEP=
PASS=
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If I am assigned to be the first mover in this task, I choose to

CE

********************************************************************************

DECISION TO MAKE AS SECOND-MOVER

AC

There is no decision to make as a second-mover in Decision Environment #4, as the secondmover is a computerized choice algorithm.
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